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The end result is: our foreign policy is a policy without drive,
a policy stricken with a poverty of ideas.
You have just heard me criticize the Administration 1 s foreign
policy.

Perhaps you are asking yourselves what ideas do I have as an

alternative to the Administration 1 s policy.

I must admit that I have very

few ideas because while I have devoted as much time as I could to these
possibilities, I have of course had other duties to perform, as well as
other legislation to consider; however, I do have some ideas which I
offer to you for your consideration and which I hope the Administration
would consider seriously.
I do not think that we have recognized the importance of the
Bandung Conference and the emergency of the Arab-Asian bloc.

I think

we have glossed over the results of that conference in a too optimistic
manner, and I feel further that we have failed to recognize the significance of the emergence of the continent of Africa in this respect.
I feel also that an economic conference should be called in the
Far Eastern area so that the question of Japan -- an area smaller in
size than the State of Montana, with 89 million people, an increase of
three million people every year, and not more than 16 percent of its land
arable -- could be considered.

Japan, to my way of thinking, is the most

important area in the whole of the Far East.

Unless something is done,
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it is quite likely that Japan may be lost to the West.
Japan is faced with one question and three choices.
"Where is the next meal coming from?"

At the present time
The question is,

The choices are: (1) the free

world will open its markets to the importations of Japanese goods, or
(2) Japan will continue to be subsidized, in part at least, by the United
States, or (3) Japan will go communist.

If she goes communist, it will

not be because of sympathy for that ideology, but because of economic
necessity.
I think also that this country should take the lead in calling an
economic conference to deal with Western Europe.
')

t

economic

~ationalism

is once again taking

I believe the idea of

over.~ the

policy of "devil

j#

take the hindmost'', now in operation as far as nearly all our western
~

allies are concerned.
I believe also that we should face up to the very real problem
of German unification and recognize that the Soviet Union
today alone holds the key to that matter,

K1UI~Nrt

The Soviet Union can bring about

the restoration of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse now occupied by Poland,
a settlement of the Sudeten question, greatJN

~·ltn

the satellites and

the Soviet Union, and German unification in return for a treaty of
neutrality and a breaking away of West Germany from the NATO alliance.
I am quite sure that is this proposal were made to Mr. Adenauer today,
he would turn it down, but I am not sure that the German people would.
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I foresee the distinct possibility of West Germany becoming more friendly
~I. t ~~

.

"

with the Soviet Union and the emergen ce of al'bloc strong enough to
advocate G erman neutrality and a breaking away from NATO.

I think

we should face up to this possibility and do what we can to help Germany
achieve unification along the lines she may well have to follow, if need be,
rather than see the Soviet Union maintain the initiative all the way.
I think also that there ought to be a new assessment of our
foreign aid program and a recognition of the fact that dollars alone are
not the answer.

I would like to see a doubling or a tripling of the Point IV

program on the basis of helping underdeveloped nations to help themselves
and with no imposition of American ideas or conditions which would hamper
the effect of this program.
I think also that we ought to recognize the fact that unless the
United States and its western allies regain their old strength and their
old feeling of common purpose, that the days of NATO may well be
numbered and that it, as an organization, may well disintegrate in a
period of three to five years.

In that respect, I believe that we are, 1n

part at least, to blame for the decline of NATO because we have reduced
our army, navy and Marine Corps.

W e have not built up our Air Force

sufficiently, and we have reduced our military e xpenditures year by year.
Can one blame our allies if they do the same then, and in addition consider
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seriously the shortening of conscription as they are in France at the present
time from an 18-month period down to a 15-month period and eventually to
a 12-month period?
I feel that we should not fear to discuss foreign policy in the
coming political campaign.

We should give credit to the Administration

where credit is due, as in the case of the Summit Meeting and the
President's "partnership" policy.

I believe we should criticize when

necessary but that it should l'Uikbe done constructively and)wherever
possible)alternatives should be offered.

We should und e r

•10

circumstances

become personal because the welfare of our country must always come
before victory for either political party.

I think, too, that the present

Administration should recognize that many old ideas such as the Democratic
policy of containment, which they attacked during the last campaign, have
outlived their usefulness and that other ideas should be considered in their
place.

We should recognize the fact that as far as containment is concerned,

it has become now the diplomatic counterpart of the Maginot Line.
We should also re c ognize that communism feeds on poverty,
ignorance and disease, and we should recognize that among our allies,
some, such as Korea, f e ar1 Japan more than it do e s communism, and on
the same basis, Pakistan fears India, Israel fears Egypt, France fears
Germany, Greece fears Turkey, and nationalism fears colonialism in
any shape or form.

.

.
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These are some of the ideas which I have been thinking about
and which may to some extent at least contain possibilities for future
consideration in the continual as·se s sm e nt of our foreign policy.

The

challenge to all of us as Americans is to restore the drive and to end the
poverty which marks our foreign relations at the present time .

